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ABSTRACT
Load forecasting plays a critical role in the operation and planning
of power systems. By using input features such as historical loads
and weather forecasts, system operators and utilities build forecast
models to guide decision making in commitment and dispatch. As
the forecasting techniques becomes more sophisticated, however,
they also become more vulnerable to cybersecurity threats. In this
paper, we study the vulnerability of a class of load forecasting al-
gorithms and analyze the potential impact on the power system
operations, such as load shedding and increased dispatch costs.
Specifically, we propose data injection attack algorithms that re-
quire minimal assumptions on the ability of the adversary. The
attacker does not need to have knowledge about the load forecast-
ing model or the underlying power system. Surprisingly, our results
indicate that standard load forecasting algorithms are quite vulner-
able to the designed black-box attacks. By only injecting malicious
data in temperature from online weather forecast APIs, an attacker
could manipulate load forecasts in arbitrary directions and cause
significant and targeted damages to system operations.
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systems; • Security and privacy→ Systems security; •Machine
learning→ Machine learning approaches;
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1 INTRODUCTION
Load forecasting is a fundamental step in power system planning
and operations. It is used to inform system operators the future
load profiles, and serves as the basis of decision-making problems
such as unit commitment, reserve management, economic dispatch
and maintenance scheduling [14]. Consequently, the accuracy of
forecasted loads directly impact the cost and reliability of system
operations [16]. With a growing penetration of new technologies
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into the demand side, the utilities and system operators need to
place more importance on both accurate and robust forecasts.
For years, the holy grail in short-term load forecasting has been
to improve the forecast accuracy, which has been vigorously pur-
sued by the research community. The variations in load are driven
by many different factors, including temperature, weather, tem-
poral and seasonal effects (e.g., weekday vs. weekend) and other
socioeconomic factors. All of these factors influence the load in
nonlinear and complex ways. Over the past decades, a myriad of
load forecasting algorithms have been proposed and adopted in
practice. See, for example, [7, 13, 14] and the references within.
For simplicity, in this paper, we restrict the inputs of the algo-
rithms to be the historical load data, time indicators and temper-
ature information. These algorithms can be thought of as finding
a mapping between the (high dimensional) input features to the
forecasted time series of load values. Statistical and machine learn-
ing techniques, such as support vector regression [6], ARIMA [12]
and neural networks [8, 15] have been applied to short term load
forecasting and are well adopted in practice. The recent advances
in deep learning opened the door to using more input features and
deepermodel architectures to further improve load forecasting accu-
racy and provided some of the best performances to date [20, 32, 38].
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Figure 1: The schematic of our proposed attacks on load
forecasting algorithms along with the threats over power
system operations. Without knowledge about the forecast
model’s parameters, the attacker injects designed small, un-
detectable data perturbations into weather forecasts to in-
duce abnormal system operations.
As the forecasting methods become more complex and accurate,
they are also more susceptible to cybersecurity threats. In this pa-
per, we look into the data vulnerabilities of such methods, where
an attacker adversarially injects false data into the input features
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of forecasting algorithms. Specifically, we investigate false data
injection attacks of the temperature data. It is an important input
to load forecasting algorithms and is mostly obtained from exter-
nal services/APIs, therefore providing an easier avenue for data
perturbations and attack injections. The potential damage of these
types of attacks can be significant, leading to increases in system
operation costs and maybe even more catastrophic events such as
load shedding. In Figure 1, we show the schematic of threats and
proposed attacks to systems.
In this paper, we take the perspective of an attacker and develop
attack strategies on load forecasting algorithms, and conduct dam-
age analysis of the proposed attacks. We take a restrictive setting
of both the attacker’s “knowledge” and “capabilities”, where the
attacker does not know any parameter of the targeted load fore-
casting algorithms, and could only inject perturbations into input
temperatures under constraints to avoid detection.
Under this setup, we develop two simple data-driven attack
strategies for finding the injected perturbations onto the origi-
nal temperature data. Surprisingly, we find the proposed attacks
significantly degrade the performance of a class of (accurate) load
forecasting algorithms. With only few degrees of perturbations
injected into input temperatures, the load forecasting algorithm’s
output deviates drastically from original values. We also assess the
damages brought by such model vulnerabilities in power system
operations. Simulations based on real-world load datasets show that
by changing only few degrees of temperature, adversarial forecasts
not only increase the operation cost of power systems, but can also
lead to load shedding and infeasible generator schedules.
This study illustrates the need to look at other properties of
load forecasting techniques in addition to forecast accuracy. We
demonstrate that accuracy may not mean robustness, and since a
wrong forecast of load potentially leads to costly operation decisions
or system damages, we call for amore comprehensive analysis when
developing and applying load forecasting techniques. Specifically,
we make the following contributions in this work:
• To the best of our knowledge, this is the first to evaluate
the security issues of load forecasting procedures in power
system operations. Data vulnerabilities of current forecasting
methods are discussed and formulated.
• Two data-driven, black-box attack algorithms, namely learn
and attack and gradient estimation, are proposed to
generate hard-to-detect, adversarial input data for load fore-
casting algorithms.
• Case studies on power system operations demonstrate po-
tential damages via proposed attacks. We show that the
strategically designed adversarial injections could lead to
either increased system operating costs or load shedding.
We make our code open source on load forecasting model devel-
opment, attack implementations and market operation evaluation,
and make it as a package for evaluating load forecasting robustness
and security1.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. A literature review
is presented in Section 2; we then briefly summarize a general load
forecasting model, and formulate the objective and constraints of
attackers in Section 3; in Section 4, we detail the algorithms for
1https://github.com/chennnnnyize/load_forecasts_attack
implementing the attack; to illustrate the attack’s threats to the
power system operations, we describe the market setup and a toy
example in Section 5; through simulations based on real-world load
data in Section 6, we demonstrate the threats posed by the proposed
attacks; furthur discussion on model/data security and conclusion
are drawn in Section 7.
2 RELATEDWORK
In this section, we give brief literature review on both the load
forecasting methods and cyber-security of power systems. Our
work is different from most related work in two aspects: most of
the studies in forecasts do not consider security and robustness,
while most of the studies in power system security evaluate attacks
with almost no knowledge about the targeted system or constrained
capabilities.
Our work is related to the large body of work on forecasting
in power networks, such as renewables forecasting [31] and load
forecasting [14, 30]. Since the costs of making erroneous forecasts
are so high, even reducing forecast error in a few percent points are
important [13]. Various methods have been applied and evaluated
in load forecasting problems, including using nonparametric re-
gression [7], support vector regression [6], ARIMA [12] and neural
networks [9, 15]. Among these forecast models, neural network
has become increasingly more popular, as it provides highly accu-
rate results due to the ability of representing the complex relations
between high-dimensional features and outputs.
The recent progress in deep learning and data science also pro-
motes the use of deep neural networks and more complicated fea-
ture representations in forecast models [8, 10, 20]. Many works
focus on feature selection and feature engineering by considering
the uncertainties coming from both electrical loads [39] and exoge-
nous variables such as weather [17, 38], customer behaviors [32]
etc. However, most research doesn’t look into the robustness is-
sues, and model performances under adversarial environements
are rarely discussed [11, 23].
Our work is also under the scope of cyber-physcial system se-
curity, especially the cyber-security of power systems [25]. Many
studies focused on compromising the communication, sensing or
monitoring process in modern smart grids [26, 34]. For instance,
denial of service attacks and deception attacks are aimed at com-
promising either communication channel or communication pack-
ets [2]; false data injections on state estimation have been widely
discussed [21, 22], where the attackers introduce estimation errors
on state variables, e.g., phase angles and voltage magnitudes. Such
attacks strategically manipulate meter measuresments to bypass
conventional bad data detection. In [36, 40], the authors analyzed
how maliciously changed system states could affect the market
operations during dispatch process. Most of the previous attacks
assume full knowledge of system configuration. It is also assumed
that attackers possess strong capabilities to implement attacks, e.g.,
to compromise communication channel or to modify meter data
arbitrarily.
In this paper, we focus on the previously overlooked vulnerabili-
ties in the load forecasting process. For instance, forecasting model
inputs can be exposed to adversarial modification and the model
performance may be impacted by such malicious changes. Recently,
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there has been a hot debate on the security of machine learningmod-
els [35] following the deep learning’s state-of-the-art achievements
on a bunch of benchmark tasks. In computer vision, researchers
found a small, adversarially designed noises injected to clean image
would deceive a well-trained image classifier [3, 29]. We are inter-
ested in whether such attacks could also impact the performance
of load forecasting models and if so to what extent. The proposed
class of data injection attacks do not assume the forecasting model
itself is known to the attackers. In addition, successful distortion
on load forecasting also impacts the reliable operations of power
systems, so it is important to investigate the data vulnerabilities in
existing load forecasting methods.
3 FORMULATION: FORECASTERS AND
ATTACKERS
In this section, we formally describe the forecasting and attacking
models. To set up realistic vulnerability analyses, we also describe
the set of restrictions on the knowledge and capability of the at-
tacker.
3.1 Load Forecasting Formulation
The schematic of general load forecasting model is depicted in
Figure 1. We consider the setup for a family of load forecasting algo-
rithms with different architectures. The input features of these algo-
rithms include historical records of load, weather forecasts includ-
ing temperature, weather indicators (e.g., sunny, rainy or cloudy)
and seasonal indicator variables such as weekdays/weekends and
hour of the day. Mathematically, the system operator would be
able to collect a training dataset Dtr = {(Xt−H , ...,Xt );Lt+k }Tt=1
based on available historical data. Here Lt+k ∈ [0, 1] are scalars
representing scaled load values (or response variables) [14]. k is the
model’s forecast horizon, typically ranging from one hour to one
day in short-term load forecasts. Xt−i ∈ [0, 1]d , i = 0, ...,H are
scaled, d-dimensional input feature verctors (or numerical predictor
variables). Let’s denote Xt := {Lt ,Xtempt ,Xindext }, where Lt are
the load history records; Xtempt are the temperature value vectors,
which could be acquired from either system historical records or
weather forecast API; Xindext are a collection of indicators, indicat-
ing the weather characteristics, seasonal factors and time factors.H
determines how much history of training data the operators want
to take into consideration for forecasting. Longer history would
provide more information to the forecast model, yet brings more
difficulty in model training and fitting.
In the task of load forecasting, one is interested to find a func-
tion parameterized by θ : fθ (Xt−H , ...,Xt ) = Lˆt+k , which learns
the mapping from (Xt−H , ...,Xt ) to future loads Lˆt+k . The mean
absolute error (MAE) is widely used to measure the performance
of forecasting algorithm, which is defined by the average L1 norm
of difference on forecasted loads. Estimation of θ is given by mini-
mizing the L1-norm of the difference between model predictions
and ground truth values:
min
θ
1
T
T∑
t=1
| | fθ (Xt−H , ...,Xt ) − Lt+k | |1 (1a)
s .t . θ ∈ Θ (1b)
During training, ground truth of historical records on Xt and
Lt+k are used; during testing and real-world system implementa-
tions, we are using Xt which are coming from weather forecasts to
forecast future loads. Once the model is learned, it can be applied
in a rolling-horizon fashion to make use of forecasted Lˆ along with
Xtempt and Xindext to forecast for furthur into the future.
3.2 Specific Forecasting Models
We describe the model setup for several representative load fore-
casting algorithms which have achieved good performances and
have been widely adopted [15]. In Appendix A we detaild the model
parameter settings and training approaches. We note that the vul-
nerabilitiy analysis conducted by this paper is not constrained to
the following forecasting algorithms. As long as the model out-
put is sensitive with respect to input features, our proposed attack
methods would be able to alter the load patterns maliciously.
3.2.1 Feed-Forward Neural Networks. Amulti-layered, feed-forward
neural networks (NN) has been widely used to represent the non-
linearities between input features and output forecasts [15]. For the
input layer of neural networks, each neuron represents one feature
of training input, and all features of past H steps (Xt−H , ...,Xt )
are stacked as the inputs. For each intermediate layer, NN could
have a tunable number of hidden units, which represent the input
feature combinations. Recent advances in deep learning also allow
for deeper and more comlicated network design [8].
3.2.2 Recurrent Neural Networks. A recurrent neural networks (RNN)
is a class of neural networks that are specially designed for se-
quential modeling [37]. Instead of stacking all time steps’ features
together as in the feed-forward neural networks, RNN feeds each
step’s input Xt sequentially, and outputs a hidden unit to represent
the feature combination of current input and historical features.
The last neuron outputs the forecasted load values.
3.2.3 Long Short-Term Memory. Long Short-Term Memory net-
work (LSTM) is designed to deal with the vanishing gradient prob-
lem existing in the RNN with long-time dependencies [20]. The
major improvements over RNN are the design of “forget" gates to
model the temporal dependencies and capture long time dependen-
cies in load patterns more accurately.
3.3 Objective of Attacker
The attacker’s goal is to distort the forecasted load as much as
possible in a certain direction, e.g., to either increase or decrease
forecasted values. In order to distort the output forecast values, the
attacker actually has two choices of inserting attacks: to attack Xt
or to attack θ . While the trained model itself is often safely kept by
the operators, it has to use external data such as weather forecasts
Xtempt as input features. Then the attacker’s goal is to inject pertur-
bations into the weather forecasts coming from external services to
generate adversarial input data X˜tempt for fθ (·), so that predictions
are modified. We use γ = {−1, 1} to denote the chosen attack direc-
tion by attackers. If γ = 1, the attacker tries to find X˜ to decrease
the load forecast values; when γ = −1, the attacker tries to find
X˜ to increase load forecasts values. Since load values are always
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positive, the attacker’s goal is to find X˜ that minimizes the value of
γ fθ (X˜t−H , ..., X˜t ).
3.4 Attacker’s Knowledge
We consider two attack scenarios, white box and black-box attacks.
In the white-box settings, the attacker is assumed to know exactly
the model parameters θ . This is a strong assumption in the sense
that load forecast model fθ (·) is fully exposed to the attacker. On the
contrary, in the black-box setting, the attacker only knows which
family of load forecasting model has been applied (e.g., NN or RNN),
but is blind to the forecasting algorithms and has no knowledge of
any parameters of fθ . We consider two possible avenues of attacks.
In the first case, the attacker possesses a substitute training dataset
D ′tr which may or may not be the same as Dtr . Such dataset
also represents the ground truth of historical load and features.
In the second case, the attacker cannot acquire such dataset due
to lack of access to the historical load records. We assume the
attacker has query access to the load forecasting model2. That is,
the attacker could query the implemented load forecasting model
by using different values of input features for a limited number of
times, and then try to get insights on how fθ works.
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Figure 2: Schematics for two proposed attacks on load
forecasting models by changing input temperature vectors:
(a). the learn-and-attack algorithm and (b). the gradient
estimation algorithm.
3.5 Attacker’s Capability
As an attacker, it is important to avoid being detected by the bad
data detection algorithms used by system operators. The attacker’s
capability could be upper bounded by the allowed number of per-
turbed entries in the input data; it could be bounded by the average
deviations on all features; or it could be also bounded by the largest
deviation from the original value. Mathematically, the attacker
2Such query access assumption is possible in many forecast-as-a-Service businesses,
e.g., SAS energy forecasting and Itron forecasting.
wants to keep | |X˜tempt − Xtempt | |p bounded, where p can take dif-
ferent values such as 0, 1,∞ to express certain norm constraints
corresponding to different detection algorithms.
In summary, we formulate themodel of attackers as the following
optimization problem:
min
X˜tempt−H , ...,X˜
temp
t
γ fθ (X˜t−H , ..., X˜t ) (2a)
s .t . | |Xtempt−i − X˜
temp
t−i | |p ≤ ϵ, i = 0, ...,H (2b)
Note that there is a parallel between the forecast problem (1) and
attack problem (2), where the objective’s optimization directions
and optimization variables are exactly in the opposite directions:
forecasting model works on model parameters to minimize forecast
errors, while attacker works onmodel inputs to maximize the errors
to targeted directions. However, due to lack of model knowledge
in the black box setting, it is a challenging task for attackers to
find efficient attack input X˜temp via (2). In the next section, we
will show two attack methods generally working with attacker’s
knowledge coming from substitute training dataset and query access
respectively.
4 BLIND ATTACK ON LOAD FORECASTING
In this section, we first describe attacks under the white-box setting,
where an attacker possesses full knowledge of load forecasting
model parameters. This serves as a benchmark for evaluation of the
success of attackers. We then focus on two more realistic settings
where the attacker does not know the model parameters. We de-
scribe how data injection attacks can be implemented when either
the historical data is known or the attacker has limited query access
to the load forecasting model.
4.1 White-Box Attack
Under the white-box setting, since the model parameters are known
to the attacker, it is possible to find the attack input via solving (2).
For the convenience of notations, we omit the superscript on X in
some of the following paragraphs, and introduce the generalizable
attack methods not only suitable for attacking temperature fore-
casts, but also suitable for injecting false data into other features.
Since most state-of-the-art load forecasting algorithms use com-
plex models such as neural networks, the attacker’s problem (2) is
nonconvex and furthurmore, there is no closed-form solution for
X˜t−H , ..., X˜t . Nevertheless, an attacker can still find some attack
vectors iteratively by taking gradients with respect to each time
step’s temperature values. Even though this may not find the opti-
mal solution to (2), because of the highly nonconvex nature of the
forecasting model, a slight (suboptimal) perturbation of the input
features would drastically change the forecast output.
Based on (2), we define a loss function L with respect to each
time step’s feature X˜t−i , i = 0, ...,H . Then the attacker iteratively
takes gradients of L to find the adversarial input X˜t−i . The con-
straints in (2b) is included in the loss function using a log-barrier:
L(X˜t−i ) = γ fθ (X˜t−H , ..., X˜t )−β log(ϵ− ||Xtempt−i −X˜
temp
t−i | |p ) (3)
Exploiting Vulnerabilities of Load Forecasting Through Adversarial Attacks e-Energy’19, June 2019, Phoenix, AZ, United States
Adversarial
(a) (b)
Forecasts
Ground Truth
Adversarial
Forecasts
Ground Truth
Figure 3: We show 300 hours forecasts based on original and adversarial temperature data for the aggregated load of Switzer-
land. The load forecasting algorithn is an recurrent neural networks with inputs composed of past load, regional temperature
forecast values and weather indicators. The attack perturbations are generated by using the learn and attack method, and
it implements load maximization strategy in the first 150 hours and load minimization strategy in the latter 150 hours. (a).
Load forecasting results with temperature attack constraint of (maximum perturbations) 1F ; (b). load forecasting results with
temperature attack constraint of 5F .
where β is the weight of the barrier term. Since there are a large
number of parameters and input features in many load forecasting
algorithms, it can be computationally expensive to compute the
exact gradient values for each input feature. We follow a simpler
method in [35] to only update the feature values based on the sign
of the gradient at each iteration j:
X˜(j+1)t−i = X˜
(j)
t−i − α · sign(▽X˜(j )t−i (L(X˜
(j)
t−i ))) (4)
where α controls the step size for updating adversarial temperature
values. The resulting adversarial temperature vector is obtained by
applying (4) a number of times.
4.2 Learn and Attack
In the learn and attack setting, we assume the attacker does
not have access to the model parameters, and there is no query
access to the model. The only knowledge the attacker has is a
historical dataset D˜tr , which includes same features as data set
Dtr used to train the load forecasting model3. The proposed attack
algorithm consists of a training phase and an attack phase as shown
in Fig. 2(a). In the training phase, the attacker trains substitute
model fθ˜ based on D˜tr to minimize the training loss. In the attack
phase, the attacker pretends that the substitute model is the true
load forecast model and performs white-box attacks on it to find
the attack vectors. This strategy is based on the assumption that
the substitute model behaves similarly to the true model not only
for the training data X, but also for the attack vector X˜. Then by
injecting X˜ into the true load forecasting model, the forecast values
go to attacker’s desired directions.
It is useful to evaluate the transferability of proposed attacks
across different set of models fθ and fθ˜ . The phenomenon of trans-
ferability in adversarial attacks for machine learning models have
3In Learn and Attack setting, we make assumption that the attacker know the family
of targeted load forecasting model, e.g., a feedforward neural networks or a Recurrent
Neural Networks.
been discussed in [18, 28], where adversarial instance generated us-
ing fθ˜ can be also treated as an adversarial instance by fθ with high
probability. The theoretical understanding of why attacks transfer
remains an open question and is out of scope for this paper. In
Fig. 3 we show such transferability also exists in the load forecast-
ing model. The temperature inputs are generated by implementing
the iterative gradient update (4) based on a substitute model under
L∞-norm of attack perturbations, yet such adversarial temperature
values also mislead the (unknown) true load forecasting model to
be wildly inaccurate.
4.3 Gradient Estimation Attack
To implement learn and attack on load forecasting algorithms,
the attacker needs get a version of the training data to learn a
substitute load forecasting model. In the case there is no available
historical data records, if the attacker is able to query the load fore-
casting algorithm for a limited number of times, it is still possible
to construct adversarial temperature inputs by using queries to
estimate the gradients. In Figure 2 (b) we show the schematic on
generating adversarial temperature instances via querying.
For k-th dimension of the input feature at time stamp t − i ,
X˜j+1k,t−i , the attacker needs to query the load forecasting system on
each feature dimension to calculate the two-sided estimation of the
gradient of fθ :
▽X˜k,t−i fθ (X˜) ≈
fθ (X˜ + δek ) − fθ (X˜ − δek )
2δ (5)
where ek is a d-dimensional vector with all zero except 1 at k-
th component, and δ takes a small value for gradient estimation.
Once the gradient is estimated for each dimension of temperature
features, we can follow the same method of (4) to iteratively build
the adversarial features using the estimated gradient vectors:
X˜(j+1)t−i = X˜
(j)
t−i − αγ · sign(▽X˜t−i fθ (X˜
(j))) (6)
e-Energy’19, June 2019, Phoenix, AZ, United States Yize Chen, Yushi Tan, and Baosen Zhang
To satisfy the norm constraints on the allowed perturbation
of X˜, the attacker projects the adversarial data back into the pre-
defined norms after finishing the iterative attack constructions.
In [3] techniques on reducing number of queries are also discussed
for attacking an image classifier, which could also help improve the
query efficiency of load forecasting attacks.
5 ATTACKS ON SYSTEM OPERATIONS
In this section, we first illustrate a power system operation case
consisting of a day-ahead planning stage and a real-time operational
stage, which is simple yet close to real-world market operations.
We then describe two simple temporal attack strategies that pose
threats to such system operations via injecting perturbations into
load forecasting inputs.
5.1 Power System Operations Model
(1) A commitment schedule based on the day-ahead load fore-
casts is created by a unit commitment (UC) model based on
the day-ahead load forecast:
min
u,p
C(p) + S(u) (7a)
s.t.
∑
д∈G
ptд = Lˆt , ∀t ∈ T (7b)
uti p
min
д ≤ ptд ≤ utдpmaxi , ∀д ∈ G, ∀t ∈ T (7c)
utд − ut−1д = ztд − ytд , ∀д ∈ G, t ∈ T (7d)
t∑
τ=t−t upд +1
zτд ≤ xtд , ∀д ∈ G,∀t ∈ T (7e)
t∑
τ=t−t dnд +1
zτд ≤ 1 − xtд , ∀д ∈ G,∀t ∈ T (7f)
− Rdnд ≤ pt+1д − ptд ≤ Rupд , ∀д ∈ G (7g)
utд , z
t
д ,y
t
д ∈ {0, 1}, ∀д ∈ G, t ∈ T (7h)
where utд is the binary decision variable of the commitment
status of generator д at time t , with 1 indicating д is on-
line; ptд is the real power output of generator д at time t ; all
the utд ’s and ptд ’s are collected together into vectors u and
p; C(p) and S(u) represent the dispatch costs and startup
and shutdown costs, respectively, of all the generators in
all periods; the constraints are system-wide power balance
constraint (7b), generation limits constraints (7c), generator
logical constraint (7d), minimum up time constraint (7e), min-
imum down time constraint (7f) and ramping constraints (7g).
Once solved, the operator gets the schedule for the set of
online generators Gt at each time t .
(2) For each time stage t of each day, the dispatch of the sched-
uled units and the actual dispatch cost are calculated accord-
ing to a basic Economic Dispatch (ED) model [19] based on
the actual load and generation schedule Gt :
min
pt
C(pt ) (8a)
s.t.
∑
д∈Gt
ptд = Lt , (8b)
pminд ≤ ptд ≤ pmaxд , ∀д ∈ Gt (8c)
where it aims to find the real power dispatch at time t , pt , that
minimizes the dispatch costs at time t , C(pt ), considering
system-wide power balance constraint (8b) and generation
limits constraints (8c). The daily operation cost is obtained
by summing the 24-hour dispatch costs and the startup and
shutdown costs. When the ED based on the day-ahead com-
mitment does not have a feasible solution, a load is shed to
maintain the balance between supply and demand.
5.2 Attack Strategies
Under normal operating conditions, the load forecasting algorithms
provide accurate forecasts on day-ahead load for system operators
to solve (7). During an attack, adversarial temperature forecasts are
injected into the day-ahead planning stage to cause deviation from
the normal operations, e.g., increased system costs, load shedding,
no feasible generation dispatch or violation of ramping constraints.
We assume the attacker does not know the parameters of underlying
system such as each generator’s capacity and ramp constraints.
We propose two intuitive attack strategies that move the load
forecasts as far away as possible to stress the system. Simple as it is,
the toy example in Section 5.3 and case studies in Section 6 using
real-world load data reveal the potential vulnerabilities brought by
these types of load forecasting attacks.
5.2.1 Load Maximization. Under this strategy, the attacker in-
creases the load forecasts as much as possible. Then with an over-
estimation of the system loads at each time step in the day-ahead
stage, the operator tends to turn on more than necessary generation
units, which will increases the system operation costs.
5.2.2 Load Minimization. Under this strategy, the attacker de-
creases the load forecasts as much as possible. Then in day-ahead
planning stage, the system operator underestimates the future load,
and fewer generators are scheduled than needed. If the real load
is not too much higher than the adversarial load, the system can
still use spinning reserve to satisfy the underestimated loads, but
could cause expensive dispatch. If the real load exceeds the available
capacity, load shedding could take place.
5.3 Toy Example
To illustrate why such simple attack strategies would cause an in-
crease of system costs and occurrences of operations anomalies, we
show an toy example here with 2 generators of same capacity serv-
ing an aggregate load. We demonstrate four possible unexpected
cases in Figure 4. In the simplifying case, we consider a 4-step
forecast and unit commitment. For ease of illustration, we are still
assuming there exist ramp constraints and capacity constraints in
the toy example, but no minimum up and down time constraints.
In Figure 4(a) and 4(d), the attacker drives the forecasts lower than
the real loads, and we observe either the actual load exceeds the
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scheduled generator’s generation capacity, or actual ramp exceeds
the scheduled generator’s ramping capacity. In Figure 4(b) and 4(c),
the attacker either increases the peak load forecasts, or keeps the
forecast larger than actual load. Both cases cost the system to keep
one more generator online for some time, and dispatch the load in
an uneconomical way.
There are other possible attack strategies, such as changing fore-
casts to random directions, shifting the peak load, cutting the fore-
cast peak load or decreasing the forecasted ramp magnitudes. All
these attacks could bring economic and operational damages to the
system, but should need more specific design based on the specific
load profile, temporal patterns and may require more knowledge
of the system.
Generators Capacity False Forecasts
Real Loads Real Schedule
False Schedule
(a). Load Shedding (b). Increased Costs I
(c). Increased Costs II (d). Ramp Constraints Violation
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Figure 4: Four cases illustrating consequences by using falsi-
fied load forecasts data in a toy example of power system op-
erations. Two generators with same capacity are scheduled
for 4 time steps’ operations.
5.4 Key Insights
For the general power system operations including a planning
stage (unit commitment) and a real-time operational stage (eco-
nomic dispatch), we observe the following characteristics of impacts
by adversarial load forecasts:
• Increasing the load maliciously will normally incur extra sys-
tem costs, such as starting to operate redundant generators,
using more expensive generation combinations and etc;
• By decreasing the peak load maliciously, system operators
would ignore the real peaks of future loads, and schedule
fewer generators. This would potentially cause load shed-
ding or failing to follow the severe ramps in the actual load
patterns;
• We assume an attacker with constrained capability on modi-
fying the input features for load forecast models, and with no
knowledge about the system parameters such as generator
schedule and load forecasting model parameters. The pro-
posed attack could be even more detrimental if the attacker
possesses extra knowledge of the system and implement
targeted attack during certain time periods.
6 CASE STUDIES
In this section, we show a detailed simulation on real-world Swiss
load data, and show the threats posed by our data injection attacks
in several ways. In particular, we first illustrate the proposed at-
tacks could degrade a set of accurate load forecasting algorithms
dramatically; we then quantitatively evaluate the damages brought
to the system operations, and compare the results with the case
using clean data for load forecasting. We demonstrate that attackers
with little efforts and knowledge are able to cause load shedding or
infeasible dispatch.
6.1 Experimental Setup Description
Dataset Description: We collected and queried hourly actual load
data from European Network of Transmission System Operators for
Electricity(ENTSO-E)’s API4 ranging from Jan 1st, 2015 toMay 16th,
2017, and we followed [24] to collect day-ahead historical weather
forecasts coming from major cities in Switzerland such as Zurich,
Basel, Lucerne and etc. All the weather data were queried fromDark
Sky API 5. We also collect other indicator features Xindex , such as
one-hot vectors of hour of day, day of week (weekend or weekday),
and season of year. We split 80% of data as our training sets, and
use the remaining 20% of data on validating and evaluating the
load forecasting prediction accuracy, attack performance and case
studies on market operations. Note that even though we collected
offline data to train and validate both of our load forecasting and
attack models, these data collection procedures could be applied in
an online fashion so that attacker could inject real-time adversarial
attacks into certain load forecasting models.
Power Systems Setup: The system has 1 aggregated load for
Switzerland based on the ENTSO-E data. The nominal load values
are in the range of [6, 500MW , 9, 500MW ]. We take a simplified
power system model of using 7 generators with total capacity of
11, 900MW , and omit the network constraints. We adopt the gen-
erator parameter settings of ramp capacity, generation costs and
minimum on/off time based on [19]. We set the spinning reserve
requirement as 3% of the total forecasted demand based from [33].
During the run of day-ahead unit commitment, either normal day-
ahead forecasts or adversarial forecasts are used for generation
scheduling; during the run of economic dispatch, the real loads are
used for generation dispatch. The models of UC and ED are im-
plemented in Python using PyPSA [5], and these two modules are
directly interfaced with the load forecastling and attack algorithms.
Note that even in our simiulated system, it ignores the line con-
straints, while the attacker does not know any information about
the system operation, we already observe a set of damages posed
by load forecasting attack. We expect more severe effects of attacks
with either more generation constraints or less attack constraints.
Model Training andAttack Implementation:We set up three
load forecasting models, NN, RNN and LSTM respectively, and use
standard stochastic gradient descent methods for model training [4].
For detailed model setup and training, we refer to Appendix.A. All
three forecast methods could get similar converged validation er-
rors, and as shown in the first column of Table 1, the errors in mean
absolute percentage error (MAPE) are comparable to the errors
4https://transparency.entsoe.eu/
5https://darksky.net/forecast/47.3769,8.5414/us12/en
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(a) (b)
Ground Truth
Adversarial
Ground Truth
Adversarial
Figure 5: We show 300 hours of original temperature forecasts and adversarially perturbed temperature using same data as
shown in Figure 3. (a)Temperature with maximum attack constraint of 1F ; (b). temperature with maximum attack constraint
of 5F .
Forecasts
Error (MAPE)
Clean Data Learn and
Attack
Gradient
Estimation
NN 1.68% 12.72% 13.09%
RNN 1.58% 9.82% 11.68%
LSTM 1.51% 9.04% 11.87%
Table 1: Forecasts errors evaluated on clean test data and ad-
versarial data for 3 different forecast models. Allowed max-
imum perturbations are 4F .
reported in several recent studies on load forecasting [8, 20]. We
save the model parameters and keep them away from black-box
attackers. For the substitute model training of learn and attack
method, we keep the training set D˜ same as the load forecasting
model training set D. Decreasing the size of D˜ or using differ-
ent substitute dataset could decrease the performance of learn
and attack. We use L∞ constraints on the attacker’s capability
(2b), such that the attacker is constrained by the maximum devia-
tion of perturbed temperature values. We validate trained model’s
performance under attacks with varying constrained values. For
details of training techniques, training accuracies, training and at-
tack implementation time, we refer to Appendix A and Appendix
B.
6.2 Load Forecasting Performance
We calibrate and compare the load forecasting model performance
with and without adversarial attacks on test datasets. Though all
threemodels exhibit good performances on clean test data, we inject
different level of perturbations generated by learn and attack
and gradient estimation methods respectively, and found the
forecasting performance decrease drastically as the adversarial per-
turbations become larger (Table 1). In Figure 3 we show the RNN’s
load forecasting results for 300 hours using learn and attack
algorithm with maximum perturbation on temperature of 1F and
5F . The attacker tries to increase the load in the first 150 hours, and
decrease the load in the latter hours. We observe that the algorithm
Figure 6: The forecast MAPE under (a). attacks to increase
the load; and (b). attacks to decrease the load. Simulations
are run for three times with different random seeds, and
shaded area denotes the variance.
finds the correct attack direction to either increase or decrease the
load. What’s more, with only 1F deviation on temperatures, the
load forecasts changes over 500MW at some time steps. When the
attacker increases the perturbation to 5F , larger forecasts error
over 1, 200MW are observed. The temperature profile before and
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after attack still looks similar, which could avoid system operators’
security inspection (Figure 5). Table 1 compares all three load fore-
casting models’ performance using clean and adversarial data. For
both learn and attack and gradient estimation algorithms,
they distort all three load forecasting models’ output and increase
model’s forecast error. Gradient estimation attack works gen-
erally better for all three models, and this is due to estimating the
gradients via querying fθ directly is more accurate than calculating
it from the substitute model and transferring to fθ .
In Figure 6, we evaluate RNN’s load forecasting performance un-
der two attack strategies: load maximization or load minimization.
We observe gradient estimation attack causes similar MAPE
compared to white box attack. The load decreasing attack is nor-
mally more successful than load increasing attack in terms of MAPE.
Load minimization attack is more harmful results than load increas-
ing ones, since increased forecasts only let system operators start
up more generations, while adversarially decreasing the forecasted
load leads to wrong generation decisions that fails to meet the
larger real load.
6.3 Impact of Attacks on Operation Costs
Asmentioned earlier, we are interested in the possible consequences
caused by wrong forecasts. We first analyze the increased costs
caused by adversarial forecasts. We implement learn and attack
algorithm on 3 weeks’ random selected test data to increase the fore-
casted load at each time step. Under such circumstances, the system
operator sets day-ahead generator schedule based on adversarial
loads larger than actual loads. In Figure 7 we show the bar plot of in-
creased costs versus varying perturbation on temperature forecasts.
When the temperature perturbations are small, increased costs are
limited, and such increments are mostly due to extra start-up costs.
When perturbation becomes larger, system operators sometimes
derive totally different unit commiment schedule to accomodate
higher loads and larger ramps, so in some days we observe larger
increase in system costs, of which values are 4 − 5 times of nomial
hourly operating costs.
Figure 7: With different level of malicious perturbations in-
jected into temperature features, wrong forecasts increase
system operation costs. The nomial hourly operating costs
is around $72,000 (blue dashed line).
Occurrences
(Number of Days)
Learn and
Attack
Gradient
Estimation
Load Shedding 27.14% 31.43%
Ramp Constraints Violation 90.0% 85.71%
Table 2: The occurrence frequencies of load shedding and
ramp constratins violation in 10 weeks’ system operation
test. Both attackers are allowed to inject 4F perturbations
on temperature features.
6.4 Impacts of Attacks on Feasibility
In addition to increasing system costs, adversarial attacks on load
forecasting could even lead to worse situations. We illustrate a load
minimization strategy that leads to infeasible solutions (e.g., load
shedding, ramp constraint violations) to the economic dispatch
problem. We implement both learn and attack and gradient
estimation algorithms with maximum perturbation of 4F , and
test the results on 10 weeks’ load data. In Table 2, we note the
occurrence frequencies of both load shedding and ramp constraints
violation. Since 4F change in temperature forecasts can lead to over
1, 000MW decreasing on load forecasts, system operators tend to
keep fewer generators on. This leads to many days’ generation
capacity fall short of the load, and the scheduled generators can not
fulfill the large ramps in real load profiles. In Figure 8 we show two
examples on this two kind of failures respectively. In Figure 8(a),
during peak hours, the adversarial load forecasts let the system
operator schedule one 1, 500MW generator off compared to the case
of correct forecasts. Even taking the spinning reverse during the
day-ahead unit commitment, the actual load at the mid of the day
exceeds the adversarial load by over 1, 000MW and the total load
exceeds the generator capacity. In Figure 8(b), the actual loads are
increasing rapidly at hour 5 and 6, yet the adversarials load profile
flattens such ramps, and cause the scheduled generators incapable
of meeting the large ramp. We expect more frequent violations of
ramp constraints if the attacker specifically design attack strategies
based on the load patterns.
7 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied the potential vulnerabilities generally
existing in many load forecasting algorithms. Such vulnerabilities
have been overlooked by the development of many forecasting
techniques. We design two attack algorithms which do not require
much knowledge about the forecast algorithms, but lead to large
increase in forecast errors with adversarial data injections in load
forecasting input features. The proposed attack adversarilly ma-
nipulate the load forecasting values either to increase or decrease,
and thus provide system operators wrong information on future
demands. Experiments on real-world load datasets demonstrate
such threats over power system operations. Such threats model
along with damage analysis indicate that there need more security
evaluations in the design and implementation of load forecasting
algorithms. In order to mitigate the damages brought by such false
data injection attacks, countermeasures in building robust load fore-
casting algorithms are strongly recommended, which may include
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Figure 8: (a). An example showing that forecasts under at-
tackwould cause load sheddingwhen real loads exceed total
generation capacity; bars indicate generators’ total capacity.
(b). An example showing that forecasts under attack would
cause violation on ramp constraints during economic dis-
patch; bars indicate generators’ available total up-ramp ca-
pabilities. Maximum allowed perturbations are 4F .
anomaly detection techniques considering input data distribution
as well as other robust statistics.
REFERENCES
[1] Martín Abadi, Paul Barham, Jianmin Chen, Zhifeng Chen, Andy Davis, Jeffrey
Dean, Matthieu Devin, Sanjay Ghemawat, Geoffrey Irving, Michael Isard, et al.
2016. Tensorflow: a system for large-scale machine learning.. In OSDI, Vol. 16.
265–283.
[2] Saurabh Amin, Alvaro A Cárdenas, and S Shankar Sastry. 2009. Safe and se-
cure networked control systems under denial-of-service attacks. In International
Workshop on Hybrid Systems: Computation and Control. Springer, 31–45.
[3] Arjun Nitin Bhagoji, Warren He, Bo Li, and Dawn Song. 2018. Practical Black-
box Attacks on Deep Neural Networks using Efficient Query Mechanisms. In
European Conference on Computer Vision. Springer, Cham, 158–174.
[4] Léon Bottou. 2010. Large-scale machine learning with stochastic gradient descent.
In Proceedings of COMPSTAT’2010. Springer, 177–186.
[5] T. Brown, J. Hörsch, and D. Schlachtberger. 2018. PyPSA: Python for Power
System Analysis. Journal of Open Research Software 6, 4 (2018). Issue 1. https:
//doi.org/10.5334/jors.188 arXiv:1707.09913
[6] Ervin Ceperic, Vladimir Ceperic, Adrijan Baric, et al. 2013. A strategy for short-
term load forecasting by support vector regression machines. IEEE Transactions
on Power Systems 28, 4 (2013), 4356–4364.
[7] W Charytoniuk, MS Chen, and P Van Olinda. 1998. Nonparametric regression
based short-term load forecasting. IEEE transactions on Power Systems 13, 3 (1998),
725–730.
[8] Kunjin Chen, Kunlong Chen, Qin Wang, Ziyu He, Jun Hu, and Jinliang He. 2018.
Short-term Load Forecasting with Deep Residual Networks. IEEE Transactions
on Smart Grid (2018).
[9] Ying Chen, Peter B Luh, Che Guan, Yige Zhao, Laurent D Michel, Matthew A
Coolbeth, Peter B Friedland, and Stephen J Rourke. 2010. Short-term load fore-
casting: similar day-based wavelet neural networks. IEEE Transactions on Power
Systems 25, 1 (2010), 322–330.
[10] Yize Chen, Yuanyuan Shi, and Baosen Zhang. 2017. Modeling and optimization
of complex building energy systems with deep neural networks. In 2017 51st
Asilomar Conference on Signals, Systems, and Computers. IEEE, 1368–1373.
[11] Yize Chen, Yushi Tan, and Deepjyoti Deka. 2018. Is Machine Learning in Power
Systems Vulnerable?. In 2018 IEEE International Conference on Communications,
Control, and Computing Technologies for Smart Grids (SmartGridComm). IEEE,
1–6.
[12] Javier Contreras, Rosario Espinola, Francisco J Nogales, and Antonio J Conejo.
2003. ARIMA models to predict next-day electricity prices. IEEE transactions on
power systems 18, 3 (2003), 1014–1020.
[13] Jan G De Gooijer and Rob J Hyndman. 2006. 25 years of time series forecasting.
International journal of forecasting 22, 3 (2006), 443–473.
[14] George Gross and Francisco D Galiana. 1987. Short-term load forecasting. Proc.
IEEE 75, 12 (1987), 1558–1573.
[15] Henrique Steinherz Hippert, Carlos Eduardo Pedreira, and Reinaldo Castro Souza.
2001. Neural networks for short-term load forecasting: A review and evaluation.
IEEE Transactions on power systems 16, 1 (2001), 44–55.
[16] Benjamin F Hobbs, Suradet Jitprapaikulsarn, Sreenivas Konda, Vira Chankong,
Kenneth A Loparo, and Dominic J Maratukulam. 1999. Analysis of the value for
unit commitment of improved load forecasts. IEEE Transactions on Power Systems
14, 4 (1999), 1342–1348.
[17] Tao Hong, Pu Wang, Anil Pahwa, Min Gui, and Simon M Hsiang. 2010. Cost
of temperature history data uncertainties in short term electric load forecast-
ing. In Probabilistic Methods Applied to Power Systems (PMAPS), 2010 IEEE 11th
International Conference on. IEEE, 212–217.
[18] Hossein Hosseini, Yize Chen, Sreeram Kannan, Baosen Zhang, and Radha Pooven-
dran. 2017. Blocking transferability of adversarial examples in black-box learning
systems. arXiv preprint arXiv:1703.04318 (2017).
[19] Daniel S Kirschen and Goran Strbac. 2018. Fundamentals of power system eco-
nomics. John Wiley & Sons.
[20] Weicong Kong, Zhao Yang Dong, Youwei Jia, David J Hill, Yan Xu, and Yuan
Zhang. 2017. Short-term residential load forecasting based on LSTM recurrent
neural network. IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid (2017).
[21] Oliver Kosut, Liyan Jia, Robert J Thomas, and Lang Tong. 2010. Malicious data
attacks on smart grid state estimation: Attack strategies and countermeasures.
In Smart Grid Communications (SmartGridComm), 2010 First IEEE International
Conference on. IEEE, 220–225.
[22] Yao Liu, Peng Ning, and Michael K Reiter. 2011. False data injection attacks
against state estimation in electric power grids. ACM Transactions on Information
and System Security (TISSEC) 14, 1 (2011), 13.
[23] Jian Luo, Tao Hong, and Shu-Cherng Fang. 2018. Benchmarking robustness of
load forecasting models under data integrity attacks. International Journal of
Forecasting 34, 1 (2018), 89–104.
[24] Daniel L Marino, Kasun Amarasinghe, and Milos Manic. 2016. Building energy
load forecasting using deep neural networks. In Industrial Electronics Society,
IECON 2016-42nd Annual Conference of the IEEE. IEEE, 7046–7051.
[25] Patrick McDaniel and StephenMcLaughlin. 2009. Security and privacy challenges
in the smart grid. IEEE Security & Privacy 3 (2009), 75–77.
[26] Yilin Mo and Bruno Sinopoli. 2009. Secure control against replay attacks. In
Communication, Control, and Computing, 2009. Allerton 2009. 47th Annual Allerton
Conference on. IEEE, 911–918.
[27] Vinod Nair and Geoffrey E Hinton. 2010. Rectified linear units improve re-
stricted boltzmann machines. In Proceedings of the 27th international conference
on machine learning (ICML-10). 807–814.
[28] Nicolas Papernot, Patrick McDaniel, and Ian Goodfellow. 2016. Transferability
in machine learning: from phenomena to black-box attacks using adversarial
samples. arXiv preprint arXiv:1605.07277 (2016).
[29] Nicolas Papernot, PatrickMcDaniel, Somesh Jha, Matt Fredrikson, Z Berkay Celik,
and Ananthram Swami. 2016. The limitations of deep learning in adversarial
settings. In Security and Privacy (EuroS&P), 2016 IEEE European Symposium on.
IEEE, 372–387.
[30] Dong C Park, MA El-Sharkawi, RJ Marks, LE Atlas, and MJ Damborg. 1991.
Electric load forecasting using an artificial neural network. IEEE transactions on
Power Systems 6, 2 (1991), 442–449.
[31] Pierre Pinson, Christophe Chevallier, and George N Kariniotakis. 2007. Trading
wind generation from short-term probabilistic forecasts of wind power. IEEE
Transactions on Power Systems 22, 3 (2007), 1148–1156.
[32] Franklin LQuilumba,Wei-Jen Lee, HengHuang, David YanshiWang, and Robert L
Szabados. 2015. Using Smart Meter Data to Improve the Accuracy of Intraday
Load Forecasting Considering Customer Behavior Similarities. IEEE Trans. Smart
Grid 6, 2 (2015), 911–918.
[33] Yann Rebours and Daniel Kirschen. 2005. What is spinning reserve. The University
of Manchester 174 (2005), 175.
[34] Siddharth Sridhar, Adam Hahn, Manimaran Govindarasu, et al. 2012. Cyber-
Physical System Security for the Electric Power Grid. Proc. IEEE 100, 1 (2012),
210–224.
[35] Christian Szegedy,Wojciech Zaremba, Ilya Sutskever, Joan Bruna, Dumitru Erhan,
Ian Goodfellow, and Rob Fergus. 2013. Intriguing properties of neural networks.
Exploiting Vulnerabilities of Load Forecasting Through Adversarial Attacks e-Energy’19, June 2019, Phoenix, AZ, United States
arXiv preprint arXiv:1312.6199 (2013).
[36] Song Tan, Wen-Zhan Song, Michael Stewart, Junjie Yang, and Lang Tong. 2018.
Online data integrity attacks against real-time electrical market in smart grid.
IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid 9, 1 (2018), 313–322.
[37] J Vermaak and EC Botha. 1998. Recurrent neural networks for short-term load
forecasting. IEEE Transactions on Power Systems 13, 1 (1998), 126–132.
[38] Pu Wang, Bidong Liu, and Tao Hong. 2016. Electric load forecasting with recency
effect: A big data approach. International Journal of Forecasting 32, 3 (2016),
585–597.
[39] Yi Wang, Ning Zhang, Qixin Chen, Daniel S Kirschen, Pan Li, and Qing Xia.
2018. Data-driven probabilistic net load forecasting with high penetration of
behind-the-meter PV. IEEE Transactions on Power Systems 33, 3 (2018), 3255–3264.
[40] Le Xie, Yilin Mo, and Bruno Sinopoli. 2010. False data injection attacks in
electricity markets. In Smart Grid Communications (SmartGridComm), 2010 First
IEEE International Conference on. IEEE, 226–231.
A DETAILS ON LOAD FORECASTING
ALGORITHMS
We set up all load forecasting models using Tensorflow [1] package
in Python. Standard model architectures such as Dropout layers and
nonlinear activation functions (e.g., ReLU or Sigmoid functions) are
adopted in the deep learning models [27]. Since all three networks
are set up to solve the load forecasting regression problem, we set
the first layer having most neurons, and decrease the number of
units in subsequent layers.
Forecasts Models NN RNN LSTM
Number of Layers 4 3 3
Training Epochs 20 30 30
Hidden Units in First Layer 512 64 64
Table 3: Model architectures and training configurations for
load forecasting algorithms used in the simulations.
As shown in Figure 9, all three model’s loss are converged during
training, and we use the trained model in the subsequent planning
and operation problem as well as the testbed for attack algorithms.
Plots are showing the mean and variance during 3 runs with differ-
ent random seeds.
Figure 9: All three forecasting models, show convergence of
forecast error on validation data as training evolves. Shaded
areas show the variance of MAPE.
B COMPUTATION TIME
We recorded the computation time for neural network training and
the implementation time for two proposed attack algorithms. All
time are recorded on a laptop with Intel 2.3GHz Core i5-8259U 4
Cores CPU and 8 GB RAM. The training time for NN, RNN and
LSTM are calculated for 20, 30 and 30 epochs respectively. The
implementation time for the attacks are averaged over all test in-
stances. We could observe that learn and attack approach takes
longer time than gradient estimation due to the longer time
taken to calculate gradient signs over the whole neural networks;
and as LSTM includes more complicated model architectures, it
takes longer time to find the adversarial instance. Yet compared to
the longmodel training time and application scenarios of day-ahead
forecasts, the attacker is still efficient enough to find the adversarial
perturbations.
Forecasts Models NN RNN LSTM
Training Time 12.988 47.998 143.830
Learn and Attack 0.133 0.157 0.579
Gradient Estimation Attack 0.082 0.119 0.253
Table 4: Computation time (in seconds) for load forecasting
model training and implementation time for attacks.
